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INTRODUCTION
The United States stands at the brink of a revolution.
Telecommunications technology evolves at a pace that makes even
the most contemporary systems obsolete. This technological
revolution could yield tremendous results in fields as diverse as
education and health care.
* United States Representative, 4th District of Ohio, elected 1981. House
Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance. B.A. 1966, Miami University (Ohio); J.D. 1969, Ohio State University. I wish
to thank Carl Artman, Esq., legislative assistant, for his help in researching and writing
this Article.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
Unfortunately, the positive results of this change are fettered
by government policies that were meant to regulate a different
time and a less complex telecommunications field. As Congress
grapples with the proper method to regulate the interactions
between companies that are on the forefront of change, other
nations are allowing the entrepreneurial spirit to flourish. These
restrictive U.S. policies hinder the advancement of the United
States as the telecommunications standard-bearer of the global
village. These policies also retard growth in other industries and
occupations that rely on communications.
Cable television companies and telephone companies in the
United States are well situated to deploy a nationwide interactive
broadband communications network. Congress, by not allowing
these two forces to compete or cooperate, is missing a tremendous
opportunity to expedite the process. Congress's rationale for its
overreaching policy is rooted in an obsolete notion that telephone
companies (telcos or common carriers) would use their financial
power to thwart cable operators' technological advancement.
This Article analyzes how the changing marketplace and
technology has made unconstitutional the cross-ownership ban
prohibiting the telephone companies from entering the highly
profitable business of video programming distribution. Although
many constitutional attacks exist, this Article will analyze the
ban's constitutionality against the backdrop of prior restraint and
commercial speech jurisprudence. It will then outline a regulatory
approach that is more consistent with the contemporary technology
and the business atmosphere. Finally, it will review the potential
benefits of competition and cooperation between the emerging
leaders of wire-based telecommunications.
I. HISTORY OF THE CABLE-TELEPHONE COMPANY
OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS
Telephone company provision of cable television service has
concerned the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
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Commission) for over two decades. In 1969, the Commission
initiated a rulemaking proceeding in order to determine whether
telephone companies should be able to provide cable television
service, and if so, what conditions should be attached to any such
authorization.2 The Commission subsequently determined that a
central problem in the evolving cable television marketplace was
the
anomalous competitive situation between CATV [community
antenna television] systems affiliated with the telephone companies,
and those which have no such affiliation, but have to rely on the
telephone companies for either construction and lease of channel
facilities or for the use of poles for the construction of their own
facilities.3
In 1970, when the cable industry was in its infancy, the
Commission adopted rules that prohibited all telcos from providing
video programming to subscribers in their respective local service
area, either directly or indirectly through an affiliate.' The restric-
tions barred telcos from having any sort of business or financial
relationship with cable operators, other than a carrier-user arrange-
ment.' The Commission was concerned that telcos would engage
in improper cross-subsidization, hinder the development of
broadband cable services, and use control of telephone poles and
conduit space to prevent or hinder competition from independent
cable companies.'
1. In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-63.58, Further
Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 3 FCC Rcd. 5849 (1988)
[hereinafter Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership Rules] (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §63.54).
2. Applications of Tel. Cos. for Certain Certificates for Channel Facils., Notice of
Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making Regarding Community Antenna TV Sys.,
34 Fed. Reg. 6290 (1969).
3. In re Applications of Tel. Cos. for § 214 Certificates for Channel Facils.
Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna TV Sys., Final Report and Order, 21
F.C.C.2d 307, para. 43 (1970).
4. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GLOBALIZATION OF THE MASS MEDIA 141 (1993) [hereinafter
NTIA, GLOBALIZATION] (discussing the history of the cable-telco cross-ownership
prohibition).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Congress codified these rules, in a less restrictive manner, in
the 1984 Cable Act.7 The statutory language provided that the
Commission could waive the provisions in areas where the
delivery of video programming would not otherwise exist or upon
a showing of good cause.8
The 1984 Cable Act essentially deregulated cable television,
allowing it to enjoy uninhibited growth. Subscriber rates rose
rapidly and the quality of service declined. 9 A 1990 FCC report
concluded that the cable industry enjoyed very little market
pressure in the local service area.1" Soon thereafter, Congress and
the Commission began to ponder whether reregulation was
necessary, or whether a competitive marketplace would encourage
lower prices, improved service, and the distribution of advanced
technologies.
Since passage of the 1984 Cable Act, the cable industry has
undergone rapid growth. It has evolved from mere community
antenna television into an industry that generates billions in annual
revenues. "Nearly 56 million households, over 60 percent of the
households with televisions, subscribe to cable television, and this
percentage is almost certain to increase.""1 Cable service is now
accessible to more than 95 percent of the television households,
and approximately 60 percent of those households subscribe to
7. Id.; see also Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98
Stat. 2779 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(4) (1988). This, according to the legislative history of the
law, overruled the previous rural exemption under the FCC rules. Congress intended to
permit telcos into rural areas to provide cable television service without qualification.
Therefore, a telco could deliver video programming in its service area even if there was
a preexisting system or one under construction. This was prohibited in the FCC rules.
See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4655, 4693-94.
9. See In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies
Relating to the Provision of Cable TV Serv., Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 4962, para. 6 (1990)
[hereinafter Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable TV Serv.].
10. Cf. id. paras. 69-70 ("Generally there is no close substitute for that steadily
expanding complement of specialized program services offered by the typical cable
system at this time.").
11. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1238.
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cable service.12 Today over nine thousand cable systems exist. 3
However, the large number of cable systems has not promoted
local competition. The quality of service has decreased while the
prices have increased. In fact the General Accounting Office has
concluded that since deregulation, cable systems have raised rates
for basic service an average of 43 percent.'
4
Congress's goal of allowing growth in the cable industry was
realized. However, competition fell to the wayside. In fact, the
1992 Cable Act 5 codified a strict review of local laws that
prohibited awarding a competing franchise in a locality that
already had a pre-established cable franchise.'6
These changes did not go unnoticed by Congress. In creating
the Cable Act of 1992, Congress found that "competition to cable
from alternative multichannel video technology ha[d] failed to
materialize."' 7 This resulted in undue market control for cable
operators as compared to that of consumers and providers of video
programming.'8 After the passage of the 1984 Cable Act, not
only did cable rates increase at three times the rate of inflation,19
but, in addition, Congress found that cable operators were
increasingly vertically integrated into programming, and had the
ability to discriminate in favor of their affiliated programmers.2"
12. See H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1992). It is estimated that
more households in America have televisions than telephones. Industry studies have
concluded that 98% of U.S. households have a television set, Gregory Cerio & Lucy
Howard, Tale of the Tube, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1993, at 6, 6; 93% of U.S. households
subscribe to telephone service, Sandra Sugawara, Firm Urges FCC to Alter Phone
Policy, 'Universal Service' Revision Proposed, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1993, at C4.
13. L.J. Davis, Television's Real-Life Cable Baron, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, § 6
(Magazine), at 16, 52.
14. Id.
15. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-611
(West Supp. 1993)).
16. 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
17. H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note 12, at 26.
18. Id. at 14.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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This power produced an effective barrier to entry by potential
competitors.2 1
The dramatic changes in the video services marketplace led
the three agencies responsible for administering the cable-telco
ban-the FCC, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), and the Department of Justice (DOJ)-to
independently conclude that the cross-ownership ban was obsolete.
The FCC examined the status of the cable marketplace and
rejected reregulation as a solution to the problem. Instead, it
favored policies that would encourage competition in the market-
place.22
The NTIA supported the FCC's 1992 decision to amend its
rules to permit telcos to have a greater role in the distribution of
video programming.23 It also supported the FCC's recommenda-
tion to Congress that it repeal the cable-telco cross-ownership
prohibition.2 4 The benefits of telco entry into the video program-
ming business would outweigh the potential costs of telco
provision of video programming. These costs were either over-
stated or could be effectively ameliorated by adapting existing
regulatory safeguards to suit the video programming market-
place.2 ' The NTIA also concluded that telco provision of video
programming would offer direct competition to incumbent cable
systems, thus expanding competition in the provision of home
video programming and multiplying opportunities for entry by
independent program providers.26
21. Id.
22. Cf Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable TV Serv., supra note 9, para. 91
("[W]e find it unnecessary to propose any specific structural limitations."). This is
consistent with the Commission's earlier conclusion that "greater participation in the
provision of cable television service by telephone common carriers pursuant to
appropriate safeguards would result in greater, not lesser, competition in cable television
service and, therefore, in greater public interest benefits to consumers." Telco-Cable
Cross-Ownership Rules, supra note 1, para. 1.
23. See NTIA, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 4, at 144.
24. Id.
25. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION 235 (1991)
[hereinafter NTIA, AGE OF INFO.].
26. Id.
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The Department of Justice concluded that telco ownership
and operation of video programming would have procompetitive
benefits that would outweigh any anticompetitive risks.27
Telephone company entry, according to DOJ, would introduce a
needed competitor to the video programming market; provide
greater incentives for telephone companies "to take the financial risk
of developing" improved telephone networks capable of carrying
video programming because relief "will insure an affordable source
of programming for their new networks"; and allow telephone
companies to compete more effectively with cable operators, which
are already vertically integrated.28
Most importantly, the video services consumers would be best
served by the removal of the ban.
It is clear that technology and marketplace demand have
obviated the need for the Section 613 ban on cable-telco cross-
ownership. Without competition, the cable industry grew into a
monopoly, and the rapid expansion of the cable industry effec-
tively eliminated the reasons supporting the prohibition against
telephone company entry into the video distribution market. The
current policy forces consumers to suffer the consequences of
higher rates and lower quality of service. The resultant myopic
reregulation of the industry only half-heartedly attacks one portion
of the problem.
Furthermore, the ban, for all of the same reasons, no longer
enjoys legal support. In fact, the evolution of the marketplace has
forced a law, already on dubious legal grounds, to become
unconstitutional.
II. THE SECTION 613 BAN AS A PRIOR RESTRAINT
From the moment Congress enacted the Section 613 ban on
cross-ownership, the telcos' First Amendment rights have been
relegated to a tertiary level of concern. Telcos have been regarded
as entities deserving unique and more onerous attention due to
their historical monopoly over the local telephone loop. However,
27. Brief for Plaintiff at 16, Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United
States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993) (No. 92-1751-A).
28. Id. (quoting Reply Comments of the U.S. DOJ, Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-
Ownership Rules, CC Dk. No. 87-266, at 44 (Mar. 13, 1992) (Doe. App., Tbl. 6)).
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this status should not deprive them of their First Amendment
rights, especially in light of the fact that the industry that was to
be protected from the telcos' omnipotence has built an equally
strong financial foundation, and now enjoys a similar monopoly
in the local cable loop. Therefore, the ban should no longer be
viewed as a mere protection, but instead as a restraint on expres-
sion.
The telcos desire to engage in the distribution of video
programming to homes. However, as established, the government
prohibits such distribution due to an unjustified fear that the telcos
would use their market power to force the cable operators out of
the market. The goal of Congress in the codification of the
prohibition was to circumscribe telco business activities that could
injure and delay the growth of a nascent industry and the subse-
quent deployment of a broadband information highway. However,
in the process of reaching this goal, Congress shackled the telcos'
ability to express themselves to their customers. In reality,
Congress placed a prior restraint on the telcos' speech.
Sir William Blackstone laid the cornerstone for the jurispru-
dence of prior restraint when he stated:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publication, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy
the freedom of the press .... 2
9
Nearly two centuries later, the Supreme Court introduced the
theory of prior restraint into American jurisprudence in Near v.
Minnesota.3" This case involved a statute that authorized judicial
abatement of any newspaper or periodical deemed "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory."' 31 A Minneapolis periodical sought
to expose the corruption of gangsters and the city officials who
cooperated with them.3' The state court found that the publication
29. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52 (emphasis in original)
(referring to the English Licensing Act of 1662).
30. Near, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
31. Id. at 701.
32. Id. at 704.
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violated the statute,33 but the Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional as an invalid prior restraint on the freedom of
expression.34
The theory of prior restraint has been used most commonly
in cases involving injunctions and protective orders. New York
Times Co. v. United States,35 the "Pentagon Papers" case, is the
most famous example of government attempting to suppress the
media through injunction. However, the case involved a national
security matter and was decided with undue haste, yielding
numerous concurring opinions with varying rationales. Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart6 presents a more coherent and refined
holding for cases involving this sort of prior restraint.
In Nebraska Press Ass'n, a Nebraska state trial judge, in
anticipation of a murder trial, issued an order that forbade the
confessions or statements of the accused from being published by
the press.37 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
determine whether the order violated the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of the press, and found that pretrial publicity does not
necessarily lead to an unfair trial.38 It also found that the trial
court's conclusion that pretrial publicity would alter the outcome
of the case was "speculative," and that the record indicated that
the judge explored no other means to prevent this result.3 The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Nebraska Supreme
Court, holding that "the heavy burden imposed as a condition to
securing a prior restraint was not met."4
The Court reiterated that the First Amendment guarantees that
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. It
also stated that this guarantee affords "special protection against
orders that prohibit the publication or broadcast of particular
33. Id. at 706.
34. Id. at 722.
35. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
36. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
37. Id. at 542.
38. Id. at 554.
39. Id. at 563.
40. Id. at 570.
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information or commentary-orders that impose a 'previous' or
'prior' restraint on speech."41 The Court admonished, "[P]rior
restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the
least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights. '42 This
restraint is particularly loathsome due to the fact that it has an
immediate and irreversible effect, especially when it falls upon the
communication of news and commentary of current events. 43 In
other words, "the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbabil-
ity," did not justify the invasion of free speech that was necessary
to avoid the danger.' Injunctions, as one form of prior restraint,
are subject to the independent presumption of unconstitution-
ality.45
Along with injunctions, a second form of prior restraint is
administrative preclearance.46 Prior restraint arises within this
arena when a license is needed from an executive body in order
to execute an action. The Supreme Court, in Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham,47 set the parameters by which an administrative
prior restraint must be judged. In Shuttlesworth, the leader of a
civil rights march in Birmingham, Alabama, was arrested for
violating a city statute that prohibited parades or processions in the
city streets without first obtaining a permit from the City Commis-
sion.48 The statute permitted the Commission to refuse the permit
if its members believed that the proposed parade endangered the
health, safety, or welfare of the city's residents.49
The Court, in overturning the city code, held that this
ordinance contradicted the doctrine that had evolved in the
previous three decades: a law subjecting the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms to prior restraint, without a narrow,
41. Id. at 556.
42. Id. at 559.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 564 (paraphrasing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir.
1950) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1958)).
45. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 426 (1983).
46. See generally id. at 422-26.
47. Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
48. Id. at 148.
49. Id. at 149-50.
[Vol. 46
CABLE-TELCO CROSS-OWNERSHIP
objective, and definite standard to guide its administration, is
unconstitutional." "It is settled... that an ordinance which...
makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution
guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official...
is an unconstitutional censorship ... ."s The Court affirmed that
a government may not empower an administrative official to
"roam essentially at will, dispensing or withholding permission to
speak" in accordance with the official's own "opinions regarding
the potential effect of the activity in question on the 'welfare,'
'decency,' or 'morals' of the community." 2
The Section 613 ban can be viewed as nothing less than an
administrative prior restraint imposed by Congress. The ban seeks
to prohibit a group of speakers, telephone companies, from
entering the mass media. 3 The statute seeks to suppress the
speech of a class of speakers based simply upon the nature of the
business in which they engage.54
This situation is analogous to a licensing statute. In City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing,5 the Court stated that a
licensing statute concerning the freedom of expression, which
places unbridled discretion in the hands of the government,
constitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship. 6 The
unfettered discretion to censor, held in the hands of an administra-
tive agent, coupled with the power of a prior restraint, can
intimidate a party into censoring its own speech, even if the
discretion is never abused.57 Control of expression through this
50. Id. at 150-51.
51. Id. at 151 (quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958)).
52. Id. at 153.
53. Laurence H. Winer, Telephone Companies Have First Amendment Rights Too:
The Constitutional Case for Entry Into Cable, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257, 290
(1990).
54. Id.
55. Lakewood, 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
56. Id. at 757. See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), in which the
Court stated, "[T]he right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those
freedoms of speech and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has
firmer foundation than the whims of personal opinions of a local governing body." Id.
at 272.
57. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757.
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scheme of administrative fiat results in a total exclusion of speech,
a result that is more insidious and loathsome than one that selects
only specific victims. "Proof of an abuse of power ... has never
been deemed a requisite for attack on the constitutionality of a
statute . *."..58
The Supreme Court has consistently condemned licensing
schemes that vest an administrative official with discretion to
approve or disapprove of a person's attempt at self-expression.59
The Commission defends the constitutionality of the ban by
claiming that although the "restrictions implicate First Amendment
rights, as content neutral regulations that affect speech incidentally
they can be sustained as narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial
government interest. ' 60 The Commission relies on United States
v. O'Brien61 for the proposition that the ban can be sustained as
narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government interest.62
The FCC concluded that the current ban, in light of the contempo-
rary technological, competitive, and regulatory conditions, was an
effective method to curb anticompetitive behavior that would
otherwise work to the public's detriment and impede the develop-
ment of competition in the provision of broadband services.63
It is unlikely that a court would accept the Commission's
interpretation of the law, since this approach is similar to the
strategy that the Commission employed unsuccessfully in defense
of must-carry regulations.' In Quincy Cable, the Commission
used the more lenient First Amendment scrutiny of the O'Brien
58. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
59. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951).
60. Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership Rules, supra note 1, para. 76.
61. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
62. Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership Rules, supra note 1, para. 76. "As the Supreme
Court has interpreted and applied the 'narrowly tailored' standard of O'Brien v. FCC,
content-neutral government regulation will be upheld if it in fact, '... . promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation."' Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
63. Id. para. 77.
64. Winer, supra note 53, at 291. These regulations required cable television
operators, upon request and without compensation, to transmit every over-the-air
broadcast signal that was significantly viewed in the local area. Quincy Cable TV, Inc.
v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
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standard to attempt to defend the constitutionality of the must-
carry rules,65 casting the rules as having only an incidental
burden on speech. The FCC maintained that these regulations
evinced a content-neutral standard in which the government
interest was unrelated to the suppression or protection of a
particular set of ideas.66 However, the court had "serious doubts
about the propriety of applying the standard of review reserved for
incidental burdens on speech" to the must-carry rules,67 thus
damning them to certain failure under the more critical examina-
tion required by strict scrutiny.
The court found that these regulations favored one class of
speakers over another, thereby negating the Commission's claim
that it incidentally intruded upon speech.68 The must-carry rules
were created so as to bolster the fortunes of one business over
another.69 The court further held that the "mere abstract assertion
of a substantial government interest" is insufficient to maintain a
law that subordinates First Amendment freedoms.7"
This case is analogous to the telco-cable cross-ownership ban,
in that Congress and the FCC have claimed that a situation exists
that demands the protection of a restrictive regulation. They have
not put forth any credible substantiation as to why the ban must
continue. They have undermined the constitutional rights of the
telcos in order to bolster the fortunes of a potential competitor, a
competitor that has cornered its market and has been accused of
monopolistic abuses. The prohibition is not a mere incidental
burden on the telcos' ability to express themselves. By administra-
tive fiat, telcos are completely excluded from a medium of
expression. This ban cannot withstand the lenient threshold of the
O'Brien standard proffered by the Commission. Accordingly, the
65. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1448.
66. Id. at 1450. This regulation would only be "sustained if 'it furthers an important
or substantial government interest * * * and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."'
Id. at 1451 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
67. Id. at 1453.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1454.
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ban should be struck down as an obsolete and burdensome prior
restraint.
III. SECTION 613 AS AN INFRINGEMENT ON
COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION
The prohibition on telco entry into the cable market circum-
scribes the telcos' desire to communicate with potential sub-
scribers. Inevitably, this communication would involve commercial
speech, such as self-promotional advertisements and those of
program sponsors. This commercial speech could be understood
as video programming much like that which would be seen on
broadcast stations and, therefore, a direct violation of the ban.
Further, this step into the information age would be part of a
larger scheme to interconnect the nation. Therefore, cable would
be a stepping-stone to a greater design, which would, by plan and
necessity, be built partially upon commercial speech. Thus, the
prohibition collides with the First Amendment doctrine that
protects commercial speech.7"
"[T]he Court's decisions involving corporations in the
business of communication or entertainment are based not only on
the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-
expression but also on its role in affording the public access to
discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and
ideas." 2 Commercial speech is thus constitutionally protected
71. The Court, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), succinctly sums up the history of constitutional
protection for commercial speech:
We begin with several propositions that already are settled or beyond
serious dispute. It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First
Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid
advertisement of one form or another. Speech likewise is protected even
though it is carried in a form that is "sold" for profit, and even though it may
involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money.
If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment
protection, therefore, it must be distinguished by its content. Yet speech whose
content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial
subject.
Id. at 761 (citations omitted).
72. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see also Red
Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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because it furthers the societal interest in the free flow of
commercial information.73
Speech in which telcos would engage is analogous to that of
current cable operators. The Supreme Court has held that the cable
television industry's operations plainly implicate First Amendment
interests,74 including the protection of commercial speech.
"The business of cable television, like that of newspapers and
magazines, is to provide its subscribers with a mixture of news,
information and entertainment. As do newspapers, cable television
companies use a portion of their available space to reprint (or
retransmit) the communications of others, while at the same time
providing some original content."75
This view was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Leathers v. Medlock.6
Traditional First Amendment doctrine does not lose its
validity simply because it involves an analysis of the protection
afforded to a unique and new mode of communication.77 In fact,
the core values of the First Amendment clearly transcend the
particular details of the various vehicles through which messages are
conveyed. Rather, the objective is to recognize that those values are
best served by paying close attention to the distinctive features that
differentiate the increasingly diverse mechanisms through which a
speaker may express his view."
It is unlikely that a viewer would be able to differentiate between
cable service brought to the home through a cable-owned coaxial
73. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783.
74. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm., Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986).
75. Id. at 494 (quoting Joint Appendix at 3a, Preferred Comm., 476 U.S. 488
(1986)(No. 85-390)).
76. Leathers, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). The Leathers case concerned the taxation of
media. Arkansas had imposed a tax on receipts from the sale of all tangible personal
property and specified resources. This was later amended to include cable television,
while still excluding newspapers. Cable operators filed a class action claiming that their
expressive rights under the First Amendment and their rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. The Supreme Court ruled on appeal
that cable television is engaged in "speech" under the First Amendment, and is, to a
substantial degree, part of the press. It also stated, however, that the mere fact that cable
television is taxed differently from other media does not by itself raise First Amendment
concerns.
77. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
78. Id.
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cable and that of the telco-owned fiber optic cable. Therefore, the
application of the appropriate jurisprudence should not turn on this
distinction.
The Supreme Court outlined its criteria for upholding the
rights of commercial speakers in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York. 79 The Court
developed a four-part analysis to determine if commercial speech
rights have been abridged by a government regulation. Initially, a
court must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to be protected, it must
neither concern an unlawful activity nor be misleading.8" Next,
the court must ascertain whether the asserted government interest
is substantial.8 If both inquiries yield positive responses, the
third and fourth parts of the test consist of determining whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.8" The fourth part of the analysis was modified in
Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox,83
where the Court "conclude[d] that the reason of the matter
require[d] something short of a least-restrictive-means stan-
dard.584
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Central Hudson test as
modified by Fox in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc. 85 This case involved a city zoning ordinance that prohibited
Discovery Network from placing newsracks for distribution of
commercial handbills on city streets, but permitted newspapers to
use newsracks. The City claimed that it wanted to improve the
safety and aesthetics of the area. The Supreme Court, after
analyzing the facts of the case against the backdrop of the
standard, held that the city ordinance was a violation of Dis-
79. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
80. Id. at 566.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
84. Id. at 477.
85. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
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covery's First Amendment rights, because it infringed on its
ability to engage in commercial expression. 6
The Court noted that ample evidence existed that the City did
not establish the necessary reasonable fit between the purpose of
the statute and the factual result.87 "The ordinance on which it
relied was an outdated prohibition against the distribution of any
commercial handbills on public property. It was enacted long
before any concern about newsracks developed. 8' The Court
also stated that the obsolescence of the statute was apparent by the
fact that the City did not carefully calculate the burden that it
imposed on free speech, as exemplified by the removal of sixty-
two Discovery newsracks, while allowing about two thousand
other newsracks to remain. 9
If the Section 613 ban were tested against the Central
Hudson and Fox standard, it would be found an unconstitutional
intrusion on commercial speech. The ban prohibits lawful
commercial speech. As stated by the Court in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy, speech does not lose its First Amendment protection
simply because money is spent to project it.9"
The speech that is transmitted would pass the first prong of
the Central Hudson test, in that it would concern a legal activity
and would not be misleading to the viewer. No evidence exists
that suggests that the telcos would engage in the transmission of
speech banned by other statutes or precedent. In fact, it is likely
that they would deliver programming similar to that of the current
cable operators, as well as develop interactive programming that
could take advantage of the capacity of broadband technology.
It must be determined then if the cross-ownership prohibition
advances a substantial government interest. As stated earlier, the
purpose of the ban was to prevent the telcos from using their
superior market and financial position to the disadvantage of the
86. Id. at 1517.
87. Id. at 1510.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
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nascent cable companies. This threat became moot almost as soon
as the provision became law. The cable companies grew at an
exponential rate and soon gained a financial status tantamount to
that of the telephone companies. Therefore, the ban, when viewed
in a contemporary light, must fail the second test.
Ordinarily, since the second question yielded a negative
response, the ban would fail the modified Central Hudson test and
be found unconstitutional as an infringement upon the First
Amendment rights of the telephone companies. However,
assuming arguendo that the second question yielded a positive
response, it is improbable that the ban could withstand the scrutiny
of the final tests. It must next be determined whether the regula-
tion directly advances the governmental interests asserted.
The government's interest, as established earlier, was to
protect the cable companies. The prohibition does protect the cable
industry from substantial competition. However, the government
asserted that the original need for the protection was to create a
base upon which a broadband information highway could be
built.9 This, in effect, would be giving a monopoly to the cable
industry on the technology of the future, a policy argument but not
a legal assertion. A close examination of the facts reveals that
telcos, due to the nature of their business, are in an equally sound
position to build this highway, either by themselves or in conjunc-
tion with the cable industry.
Section 613 also fails to advance Congress's purpose of
promoting competition in cable communications. In the findings
of the Cable Act of 1992, Congress asserted that a goal of the
legislation was to create fair competition in the delivery of
television programming and thus foster the greatest possible choice
of programming and lower prices for consumers. 92 In the exclu-
sion by statute of a formidable competitor in the marketplace,
91. Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership Rules, supra note 1, para. 3 (quoting In re
Applications of Tel. Cos. for § 214 Certificates for Channel Facils. Furnished to
Affiliated Community Antenna TV Sys., Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, para.
48 (1970)).
92. H.R. REP. No. 628, supra note 12, at 2.
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Congress has expressly circumvented one of the preeminent goals
of the reregulatory legislation.
The ban fails the final prong because it is more extensive
than is necessary to achieve the stated interest. This analysis
focuses on Congress's goal to protect the cable companies from
undue competition. Other means exist by which to protect the
cable companies from such a threat by the telcos. If telcos do have
a history of cross-subsidization, whereby they assign costs from
their unregulated ventures to their regulated phone business, this
practice would then force the rate payer, and not the shareholder,
to bear the burden of the telcos' forays into new lines of business.
However, a ban on entry into the provision of cable television is
not narrow enough to achieve the goal of preventing cross-
subsidization. A more appropriate measure would be to forbid this
practice with legislation aimed at addressing this issue specifically.
For the purpose of argument, the Supreme Court, in City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., assumed that the City could
prohibit the use of all newsracks for the reasons claimed.93 It
declared, however, that "as long as this avenue of communication
remains open, these devices continue to play a significant role in
the dissemination of protected speech."94
This is analogous to the scenario involving the Section 613
ban. Congress could opt to ban cable operators, satellite dish
operators, and telephone companies from disseminating informa-
tion to subscribers because it would impinge upon the broad-
casters' fiduciary and public interest responsibilities and the goal
of localism. This would, of course, stunt the evolution of the
information age in the United States and place the nation's
telecommunications companies at a severe disadvantage. There-
fore, as long as the avenue for communication remains open,
Congress must open it to everyone. Otherwise, it is unconstitution-
ally foreclosing a means of commercial communication to a
potential speaker.
93. Discovery, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516 (1993).
94. Id.
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The ban's underinclusiveness highlights its inherent unconsti-
tutionality and its fatal burden on a particular speaker's desire to
engage in commercial speech. The ban targets telcos. It does not
attempt to thwart the entry of municipalities, electric companies,
or film studios into the cable business, all of which maintain
interests in this industry.95 These enterprises are capable of posing
a financial and competitive danger to the cable operators. Cities
could use their franchise powers to monopolize a market; electric
companies could be accused of building a system on the backs of
their rate payers; and film studios could limit the distribution of
their product.
The prohibition also precludes telcos from delivering one
form of speech, video programming, that is comparable to
broadcast television.96 Yet, the telcos can provide video transmis-
sions, such as graphics, video conferencing, and videotext services
to customers in their service area.97 Even the Commission has
come to the realization that the technological metamorphosis has
caused the lines between voice, data, graphics, and video transmis-
sions to blur.98 Therefore, the ban on video programming is
actually a ban on the provision of commercial speech to sub-
scribers.
One court has found these arguments persuasive. On August
24, 1993, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Judge T.S. Ellis presiding, held in Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v. United States99 that the
Section 533 ban was an unconstitutional burden on the telco's
freedom of speech. Specifically, the court held that the ban failed
the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny test. In a footnote, the court also
95. Brief for Plaintiff at 39, Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United
States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993) (No. 92-1751-A).
96. Id. at 40.
97. In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, First Report and Order, and Second Further Notice of Inquiry,
7 FCC Rcd. 300, para. 11 (1991).
98. In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Second Report and
Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, para. 90 n.232 (1992).
99. Chesapeake, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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stated that if the "analysis regarding the appropriate standard of
review is flawed, and § 533(b) is properly subject to strict
scrutiny, then the provision would fail the 'narrowly drawn'
element of that test as well."100
The court, in accepting the fact that telecommunications is a
rapidly evolving industry, opted not to rely on precedent from
previous First Amendment broadcasting cases. "Each medium of
expression... must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by
standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.101
Furthermore, it limited the possible standards of review to either
strict scrutiny or intermediate level scrutiny, since the ban directly
abridged the telephone company's "right to express ideas by
means of a particular, and significant, mode of communica-
tion-video programming."' " In support of this rationale, the
court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that video
programming, as offered by cable companies, is a form of speech
protected by the First Amendment.
Although the court recognized that the statute must be viewed
within the parameters of heightened scrutiny, it did not feel that
the statute's wording and intention merited review under strict
scrutiny. Therefore, the ban was analyzed against the backdrop of
intermediate level scrutiny. In making this decision, the court held
that the statute was not a content-based restriction. In fact, it was
content-neutral, since it was "'justified' on grounds unrelated to
the suppression of speech .... 103
In addition to being content-neutral, to overcome intermediate
level scrutiny, the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest and allow alternative channels for
communication. 4 The ban does not foreclose all channels of
communication through video programming for the telcos. The
telcos can provide programming to subscribers outside their
100. Id. at 932 n.35.
101. Id. at 919 (citing Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557
(1975)).
102. Id. at 918.
103. Id. at 926.
104. Id. at 917 (citations omitted).
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specific service areas. Furthermore, they can produce programming
and market it within their service areas to broadcasters or cable
operators.10 5
Therefore, the crux of constitutionality is whether the ban is
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. The
court examined the government's justifications for the statute,
which were twofold: (1) the promotion of competition in the video
programming market, and (2) the preservation of diversity in the
ownership of communication media." 6 However, it discerned
quickly and correctly that only one of these reasons was valid,
since the ban "simply does not, in a direct fashion, promote
competition in the video programming market. °10 7 In fact, the
provision serves as a bar to entry into the market "by the one class
of potential competitors that has exhibited an inclination to
compete with the entrenched monopolists." ' 8
Therefore, the court concentrated on the government's second
justification-preservation of diversity of ownership. The govern-
ment has a justifiable concern with the implications of having a
single entity in control of all telecommunications conduits to the
home. Thus, the court focused on whether the regulation was
narrowly tailored as required by the O'Brien test.
The court concluded that less restrictive means could have
been chosen by Congress or the FCC that would have allowed the
telephone companies to enter the video programming market while
limiting their ability to force cable operators out of the market.
In short, if there exists a range of regulatory strategies that would
effectively eliminate the threat of anticompetitive conduct by the
telephone companies in the cable television industry, then § 533(b)
would "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
105. Id. at 926.
106. Id. at 927.
107. Id. The court, in support of this contention, noted that the United States cable
television industry is a monopoly service. "Of the approximately 10,000 communities
served by cable, as of 1991, 53 communities had more than one competing cable system
in the same locality." The ban clearly operates to stifle competition by limiting the
number of potential providers. "Thus on the most elemental level, section 533(b) actually
reduces competition, both in the market for video transport services and the market for
video programming." Id.
108. Id.
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further the government's legitimate interests," and would therefore
violate the First Amendment.'° 9
The government, to substantiate its "diversity of ownership"
argument, claimed that the elimination of Section 533(b) would
allow the telephone companies to engage in pole access discrimi-
nation and cross-subsidization in order to monopolize the market.
The court determined that the statute does not address the
telephone companies' ability to undertake these practices. It made
clear that "it is the concern the telephone companies will act anti-
competitively in the video programming market, not the video
transport market, that ultimately must provide the justification for
§ 533(b)."110
The court further noted that the telephone companies do not
have any inherent advantage that would allow them to evade the
regulation of anticompetitive behavior in the video programming
market. It also noted that there were other regulatory options
available to achieve the government's interests, but it opted not to
explore these since Section 533(b) did not even address the
behavior the government was seeking to prevent.111
The court concluded that Section 533(b) is not narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest. Rather, the law
substantially burdens more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interest. Therefore, it fails the O'Brien
test and is facially unconstitutional as a violation of the telephone
company's First Amendment rights." 2
109. Id. at 928 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
In fact, as the court notes, Congress, according to the legislative history, did not even
reach a conclusion regarding the effectiveness of less restrictive regulations. It only
examined and expressed opinions with regards to the effectiveness of § 533(b). Id. at
929.
110. Id. at 930 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 931 n.34.
112. Id. at 931-32.
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IV. A MORE RATIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
TO THE REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE
Congress and the Commission wish to regulate telco entry
into cable service. However, as discussed above, the current
method has become unconstitutional through obsolescence.
Therefore, a new method must be proposed. In the last three
Congresses, several of my colleagues and I have introduced
legislation that would fulfill the desires of those who wish to
regulate, while simultaneously giving telcos the freedom to
diversify into cable programming."" The current House version
of the bill is House Bill 1504, the Communications Competitive-
ness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1993.4 The
purpose of the bill is to encourage the modernization of the
nation's telecommunications infrastructure. It would also promote
competition in the cable television industry by permitting tele-
phone companies to provide video programming."'
The bill, if enacted, would amend Section 613(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934 to allow any common carrier subject
to Title II of the Act to provide video programming directly to
subscribers in its telephone service area, either through its own
facilities or through those of an affiliate under the control of that
common carrier. 1 6 Second, any common carrier subject in whole
or in part to Title II would be allowed to provide channels of
communication, pole line conduit space, or other rental arrange-
ments to any entity controlled or connected to the carrier, so long
as these arrangements are used for the provision of video program-
ming to subscribers in the telephone service area." 7
113. See H.R. 1504, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3701, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992); H.R. 2546, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1523, 102d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1991); H.R. 2140, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).
114. H.R. 1504.
115. Id. § 2.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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The telco would be required to establish a separate affiliate
to manage the cable distribution portion of the business. The
affiliate would also be required to maintain all necessary books
and accounts, and to carry out the bulk of its own marketing, but
would be allowed to engage in institutional advertising by the
parent telephone company. The affiliate would be prohibited from
owning real or personal property in conjunction with the common
carrier. The bill would subject all business transactions between
the telco and the video programming affiliate to regulation by the
Commission." 8
In order to ensure equal access and competition within the
industry, the telco would be required to establish a basic video
dialtone platform, to be regulated by the Commission.119 The
telephone company would have to make available such capacity
as is requested by an unaffiliated video program provider.
However, the telco would not be required to provide more than 75
percent of the equipped capacity of its basic video dialtone
platform to the unaffiliated video program providers. 2°
To prevent uncompetitive behavior on the part of the telcos,
the bill prohibits cross-subsidization. The common carriers would
be forbidden to include costs or expenses associated with provi-
sion of video service in their rates for telephone exchange service.
Furthermore, the telephone company would be prohibited from
purchasing or retaining control over any cable system that is in its
telephone service area and owned by an unaffiliated person.
However, it could obtain a noncontrolling interest in a cable
system through a joint venture. The bill also provides that the
118. Id.
119. Under the video dialtone concept, a common carrier could construct and operate
a facility within its local service area that would be capable of transporting video
images, audio messages, and graphics. The space would be leased to an unaffiliated
programmer. The rates would be regulated to ensure reasonable and nondiscriminatory
prices and practices.
120. H.R. 1504. This may seem like an unreasonable infringement upon the telco.
However, broadband technology promises to deliver an extremely high level of channel
capacity. In the current market, it would be almost impossible to meet this capacity.
Therefore, the telcos would still be able to provide as much programming as they want,
without restriction.
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Commission could waive the prohibition if the buyout would
result in a substantial upgrade through the deployment of modem
technology, if it would expand the capacity and services of the
cable system, if the purchase would be in the public interest, and
if the local franchising authority approves the waiver.'
This provision does not attempt to regulate the speech of the
common carriers. Instead, by focusing specifically on business
practices, it attempts to quell the concerns of those who believe
that a telephone company might use its financial strength to
overpower a competing cable company. This is a narrowly tailored
approach to achieve the government's interests in allowing
competition to flourish and providing advanced telecommunica-
tions services to those areas that are most often underserved.
Furthermore, the bill empowers the Commission to assess
fines and penalties as it deems appropriate in the event a common
carrier knowingly and willfully violates any provision. Penalties
could range from fines to a mandated complete divestiture of the
video programming affiliate.' These penalties could be catego-
rized as a subsequent punishment, as opposed to a prior restraint.
Even so, the penalty strikes not at punishing the expression, but
at punishing the business practices that resulted in the exclusion
of or the limitation upon a competing speaker in the market-
place.'23
V. THE BENEFITS OF AN OPEN AND COMPETITIVE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETPLACE
The Section 613 prohibition has a direct and immediate effect
on the lives and futures of the citizens of the United States that
extends beyond home entertainment. The prohibition is not
designed to cope with the technological convergence and evolution
of two traditionally separate wings of the United States' telecom-
munications industry. Together, these two wings provide the two
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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essential items in the American home: the television and the
telephone.
Currently, cable operators are deploying advanced technology
in order to offer an expanded array of video programming, and to
experiment with two-way and point-to-point communications.
Simultaneously, the telcos are deploying fiber optic cable within
their public switched networks. This technology holds out the
promise of providing video, audio, and high speed data transmis-
sion. The removal of the ban would create a competitive atmo-
sphere in which to expedite the development of public networks
with switched broadband capabilities.
The repeal of the cable-telephone company cross-ownership
ban would promote and expedite the continued development of the
United States' telecommunications infrastructure. It would provide
an incentive to the telcos to replace copper wires with broadband
fiber optic cable more quickly than the current rate of deprecia-
tion.
The argument that the telephone companies can already
facilitate the provision of video programming ignores the risk that
competitors to the current cable operators would not want to invest
in a market in which the latter already has a stake. Furthermore,
cable operators would not deploy programming over a telco
distribution facility because they have already made an infrastruc-
ture investment and can sustain market power in their current
service areas.
If the telcos are not allowed to provide their own program-
ming, they may not be able to secure programming to be carried
over their video dialtone. By 1990, large multiple system operators
(MSOs) held ownership interests in six of the eight national pay
cable networks, and thirteen of the top twenty national basic cable
networks. 24 It is reasonable to expect the competing MSOs to
prohibit distribution of their property to a new competitor. In fact,
Congress found that this practice had become so egregious that in
124. Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable TV Serv., supra note 9, para. 78.
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the Cable Act of 1992 it passed an access to programming
provision. 125
The NTIA also cited arguments that if Local Exchange
Carriers (LECs) could provide programming, they "could realize
revenues in the programming market ... which revenues could
then be used to fund 'investment in a broadband public net-
work." 112 6 Although the NTIA recognized that LECs might
conceivably realize efficiencies as program providers and stimulate
a competitive video market, the NTIA, based on the sparse record
before it, concluded "there will not be any long-term excess profits
available to subsidize" network development activities.1
The most tangible result from the elimination of the cross-
ownership ban would be lower rates and increased efficiency of
service. Currently, cable companies have little incentive to
improve either program choices or services. However, the advent
of a potential competitor in the marketplace would provide the
impetus for progress. Furthermore, a recent study concluded that
the elimination of Section 613 would result in $74.9 billion in
consumer surplus from price reductions by the year 2003.128
The revolution in communications extends beyond the mere
provision of programming. Health care, education, business
communications, and residential communications will undergo a
significant change in the wake of the deployment of a broadband
network, whether provided by cable operators or telephone
companies.
Broadband networks threaten to break down the four walls of
the traditional classroom. Experiments in distance learning
occurring nationwide highlight the advantages of interconnecting
students and teachers from different areas and backgrounds.
College professors can reach an exponentially larger field of high
school students in order to teach advanced level classes. The new
125. 47 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West Supp. 1993).
126. NTIA, AGE OF INFO., supra note 25, at 240 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 241.
128. THE WEFA GROUP, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ELIMINATING THE LINE OF BUSINESS
RESTRICTIONS ON THE BELL COMPANIES 85 tbl. 10, July 1993 (on file with the Federal
Communications Law Journal).
[Vol. 46
CABLE-TELCO CROSS-OWNERSHIP
technology allows these professors not only the ability to teach,
but also the ability to interact- with the students as though they
were in the same classroom. Fiber optics also brings new
opportunities to rural area students, who have traditionally been
deprived of the benefits of being in a large city. The students now
have access to college libraries and computers through the use of
the telephone lines.
Mississippi 2000, an experiment implemented by BellSouth,
IBM, Apple, and Northern Telecom, has improved educational
facilities available to students in the Mississippi Delta region of
the state. Fiber optics connects three colleges, four high schools,
and the Mississippi Educational Television Network studio. It
allows the institutions to interact in simultaneous, two-way, full-
motion instructional programming. 2 9 Michigan Bell has linked
six school facilities through fiber optics in the Lansing-Jackson
area. Besides other benefits, it allows high school students from
Pottersville High School to receive classes from Lansing Commu-
nity College. 130 Finally, students in the Findlay, Ohio, School
District have been interconnected to the facilities of two area
colleges by a fiber optic system deployed by Ameritech. 3
1
Health care providers are using broadband telecommunica-
tions facilities to improve health care. Of course, this benefits
hospitals and patients in major urban centers. However, the most
beneficial impact is felt by patients in traditionally underserved
areas. Since 1980, more than two hundred rural hospitals have
closed and one-fifth of the remaining rural institutions are at risk
of closing. 13 From a technological standpoint, the average rural
hospital is a generation or more behind its urban counterpart. 33
Employment of a broadband network would allow these hospitals
129. John L. Clendenin, Bringing Technology to the Classroom, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Dec. 20, 1990, at 18, 19.
130. Students, Teachers Interact with Fiber Optics, PR Newswire, Nov. 14, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
131. Scott Bargelt, Video Teaching System to be InstalledLocally, FINDLAY COURIER,
Nov. 12, 1991, at Al.
132. Better Health Care for Rural America: Hearing Before the Joint Economic
Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989).
133. Id. at 65.
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to engage in rapid transfer and information sharing, such as the
transmission, storage, and retrieval of x-rays and other medical
images. Experiments in this field are still in the early stages, but
the initial results are encouraging.
By turning the home into an office, telecommuting promises
to improve the quality of life for millions of Americans. President
Bush declared, "Millions have already found their productivity
actually increases when they work nearer the people they're really
working for: their families at home. 34 Telecommuting can
reduce stress and lost time, while increasing job satisfaction.
Furthermore, it can help businesses reduce office overhead and
allow them to reap the benefits of increased productivity. These
benefits have been enjoyed by only a handful. The infrastructure
for this sort of experiment is not yet in place. As a broadband
fiber optics network is deployed, telecommuting may become
more commonplace.
Elimination of the cross-ownership ban will allow the United
States to remain competitive in the international marketplace. The
first country to have nationwide implementation of a fiber optic
network will lead the world in the telecormmunications race in the
twenty-first century. The United States has begun developing this
infrastructure. However, Japan and other nations are surpassing us.
The Japanese government plans to have 100 percent fiber
penetration by the year 2015.135 In comparison, at the current
rate, the United States will reach this mark by the year 2030 or
2045.136
The United States is the standard-bearer of telecommunica-
tions technology. However, its position is beginning to erode in
the wake of the farsighted policy decisions of other countries. U.S.
companies have the knowledge and technology that will allow
them to retain the lead, but current policies prevent them from
134. Remarks at the National Transportation Policy Meeting, 1 PUB. PAPERS 336, 337
(Mar. 8, 1990).
135. H.R. 2546, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991).
136. Id.
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utilizing this potential and may eventually cost us the advantage
in the international marketplace.
CONCLUSION
Telecommunications regulatory policies are necessary to
ensure that the benefits of the evolving technology reach all
sectors of the United States. However, the policymakers must
avoid stifling the expression of speakers in the marketplace. An
infringement on their First Amendment rights injures speakers and
has serious repercussions on all those who benefit from the
advances that they may make. In an era of technological upheaval
in telecommunications, policymakers must not act on the basis of
a particular industry's past. Instead, they should look to the
benefits that this industry and its competitors can bring the future
generations, not only in terms of technology, but in the ability of
the citizens to express themselves.
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